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Abstract. Duplicate coverage involves those individuals who hold compul-
sory health insurance with the public sector and have additional coverage with
the private sector. The additional insurance covers costs for outpatient and in-
patient care, income loss and hospital daily allowances. The number of persons
who took out additional coverage has been steadily increased.
This increase can be linked to two main factors: the shortage in the beneﬁts
package and the introduction of the reform act (January the 1st 2004). Basi-
cally, members of the public insurance sector have to make co-payment of 10
percent for all health care services and drug prescription (maximum 2 percent
of the annual pre-tax income). Costs of transportation and dental prosthesis
have been also excluded from the beneﬁts package.
It uses the SOEP German database for estimate an demand model for
health services, given the simultaneity of the choices to take duplicate coverage
and the level of health services (measured like number of visits), we estimate
a negative binomial model to measure the impact of the duplicate coverage
on the health service demand, we also estimate a a Full Information Maximun
Loglikelihood (FIML) known in this case as an Endogenous Switching Poisson
Count Model and we compare this results with the standard maximum log
likelihood (ML) estimators of the negative binomial model.
The Results show that there is a positive diﬀerence on the level of health
services demanded when there is a duplicate coverage. We found also that there
is evidence to think that in Germany there is a feedback between duplicate
coverage and the demand of health services.
1. Introduction
The German health system is a two-tier system. While around 88 percent of the
population is covered by the statutory health insurance (SHI), about 10 percent
is covered by the private health insurance (PHI). The approximately remain 2
percent is covered other governmental insurance schemes (such as military and
police oﬃcers) [2].
Contributions to the (SHI) sector are dependent on income while in within the
(PHI) sector contribution rates depend on individual health risks. The (SHI) pro-
vides it’s members with free primary health care (until January 2005, where individ-
uals have to pay 10 Euros per each three months for a visit to general practitioners
and specialists. In general, individuals have the possibility to obtain health care
for free through the statutory insurance sector, alternatively they can pay for the
health care services or purchase (PHI), especially, some health care services are not
covered by the statutory insurance such as psychological and some dental care.
Renumeration of physicians shows some diﬀerence between the two insurance
sectors. Although the fee-for-services are quite the same within both sectors, physi-
cians are allowed to charge up to 3.5 times if an individual holds private insurance
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policy and the health problem is complicated [13]. This motivates physicians to
ﬁrst serve the privately insured individuals. On the other side, individual seeks
private insurance coverage for several reasons; to overcome the restrictions that
have been put by the statutory insurance sector such as limited choice of doctors,
shorter waiting times and lists and maybe the perceived quality of both sectors are
diﬀerent. Some individual may perceive the comfortable waiting rooms and the
friendly treatment of medical personal as better quality.
The statutory insurance is compulsory for employees, whose gross annual income
does not exceed 42,740 Euro (is called income ceiling limit and changed every year).
Tenured civil servants, self-employed and employees whose gross annual income is
above the income ceiling limit are allowed to switch to the private insurance sector
[4].
The topic of health insurance and demand for health services it is a interesting
and challenging issue. In the decade of sixties, forty years ago Arrow (1963) identi-
ﬁed the problem of moral hazard consequence of the existence of health insurance,
He foresee that the insurance systems without incentives to providers and users to
seek the low-cost services were going to increase the expenditure in health services.
Grossman (1972) studied the demand for health under the basis that health demand
does not depend only on the price of the health services, follower of Gary Becker
he postulated that the demand for health services depend also on the health cap-
ital and he postulated that more educated individuals invest more in their health
capital and for this reason they will demand a lower quantity of health services
when they become older. Cameron etal (1986) modeled the interaction between
insurance and the demand for health services using a model of two periods, they
arguing that the insurance choice was determined by the expected level of future
health services to be used. In the case of duplicate coverage Vera-Hernandez (1997)
extended the Cameron’s model for study the impact of the duplicate coverage on
the healths services demand but his empirical results were didn’t show a clear judge
against on in favor of the Cameron’s model.
In the latest years many studies ere directed to the health demand services
in Germany, Pohlmeier (1995) et al. introduce a negative binomial distributed
hurdle model that speciﬁes the two stages of the decisionmaking process as diﬀerent
stochastic processes for to study the demand of health services and the insurance
scheme, they argued that while at the ﬁrst stage, it is the patient who decides
whether to visit the physician, it is essentially up to the physician to determine
the intensity of treatment and then the demand of health services. Jochmann
(2004) They used a random eﬀects model speciﬁed in a semiparametric Bayesian
for analyze the demand for health services, they found a positive eﬀect of the
additional coverage on the demand of the health services but the don’t analyze the
endogeneity in the duplicate coverage.
Our objectives in this study will be, Finding the impact of duplicate coverage
in the health demand services and analyzing if the mechanism that the individuals
use in Germany ﬁts in the Cameron’s Model, by using the SOEP database 2005.
2. The German health care system
The German health care system have passed for many reforms, in the period
between 1977 and 1983 there were some reform acts which were aiming to containDUPLICATE COVERAGE AND HEALTH CARE DEMAND 3
spending the health sector (Herles 2000). In 1989 a new reform act was imple-
mented, this act aimed among other things at extending the opt-out option. By
passing this act blue-collars whose income is above the income ceiling were eligible
to opt out of the statutory insurance sector. A further reform act came into force
in 1993, core points of this act were cost-containment and enhancing eﬃciency.
The cost-containment has been emphasized by increasing co-payments and intro-
duction of ﬁxed budgets. The cost-containment policy was also among the aims of
the reform act which passed in 1997, this involved more co-payment in addition to
exclusion of some rehabilitative care beneﬁts. In 1999 and 2000, the government
released another decree which forced sickness funds to global budget (to spend what
they have collected from the contributions of the insured individuals). However,
these reform acts have not contributed the escalating costs of health care. The sick-
ness funds were obliged to increase the contribution rates (from 13.6 to 14 percent
between 2000 and 2003). As a response by 2004 a new reform act has been passed,
in which patients have to make co-payment for almost all services. For example,
glasses were excluded from beneﬁt package except for children and adolescents and
also transportation and impregnation have been also rationed. Also patient has to
pay 10 Euros each three months for visit to general practitioner and if individual
to go to specialist without referral he has also to pay 10 Euros.
Regulations and membership of the (SHI) are set up by the Social Code Book
(SGB V). The (SGB V) determines the individuals groups who are entitled to join
the (SHI) and the services package. The total number of the sickness funds was
136 , of which the regional sickness funds (5), the company-based sickness funds
(110), guild-sickness funds (9), substitution sickness funds (9), and three other
funds. Generally, there is marked diﬀerence among these sickness funds; the only
slight diﬀerence is the contribution rate and the nature of additional health services.
Membership in the (SHI) is either compulsory or voluntary. It is compulsory for
employees whose income is below the income ceiling (42.750 Euro per year, called
in German Beitragsbemessungsgrenze), unemployed, students, retirees and agri-
culturists. Family members of insured individuals such as unemployed wives and
children are insured for free. On the other side, is the voluntary (SHI) which oﬀers
more ﬂexible and individually determined coverage. This type of coverage includes
employees whose income is above the income ceiling as well as self-employed and
civil servants.
Contributions to the (SHI) are equally divided by the employees and their em-
ployers, which are drawn from pre-tax income; this was based between 11.9% and
15.9% depending on the sickness fund. Financing within the (SHI) is made on
pay-as-you-go base and health services provided regardless of the individuals con-
tributions. The services package of the (SHI) covers all primary, hospital as well
as dental care. Starting in 2005, members of (SHI) have to make co-payment of 10
Euros each three months for visit to general practitioner, and if individual goes to
specialist without referral from the general practitioner he/she has to pay 10 Euros.
Furthermore, members of the (SHI) have to pay between 5 to 10 Euros for drugs.
The (SHI) sector constituted of 27 percent of persons who were insured for
free and around 5 percent retirees which means that the percentage of insured
individuals whose income is high is low. Basically, each sickness fund is obliged
to insure each one, therefore, large sickness funds such as the General Regional
Sickness Fund (AOK) ends up with large proportion of high risk group.4 M. H. VARGAS AND M. ELHEWAIHI
Table 1. Population according to the type of health insurance coverage






Source: (Federal statistical oﬃce 2003)
The private insurance sector covers around 12 percent of total spending on health
(OECD 2004). In 2004, the German insurance market contained around 54 insur-
ance companies. The total numbers of individuals who joined the private health
insurance 16 millions, of which around 8.2 millions had complete coverage and 7.8
millions had supplementary coverage . The number of the complete insured in-
dividuals is frequently changing, this because of death or changing of the income
ceiling.
Eligible for the private health insurance coverage are each person who does not
ﬁt under the eligibility criteria of the (SHI) sector. Such as self-employed, civil
servants and employees whose income is above the income ceiling limit. Like the
(SHI) payments for the statutory coverage is also equally divided between employers
and employees. Unlike the (SHI) sector, contribution rate to the private insurance
coverage is determined upon individual risk group. Contracting within the private
sector is also individually, that means the more health care services you contract,
the higher is the premium . Premiums are also dependant on individual’s age at
entry, and some money of the premium are being saved for later.
The provision of health care services within the private insurance sector functions
of reimbursement base. When an individual goes to doctor he gets a bill, he can
either send this bill to his insurance company directly which in turn pays the doctor
or pays the costs directly and getting reimbursed by own insurance company. The
insurance company can decide on the insurance of individuals and the scope of
health problems. That means each insurance company when contracts an insurance
policy, it can exclude previous health problems from the coverage, and therefore
they send individuals to medical check up.
As we mentioned before, the private insurance sector oﬀers either complete or
supplementary coverage. The complete coverage provides the amount of health
services which the statutory sector provides. While the supplementary insurance
covers what the statutory does not cover . Example of the supplementary insurance
is the coverage of optional hospital beneﬁts, outpatient care, and loss of income in
case of illness, hospital daily allowances and foreign travel coverage.
3. Health services demand and duplicate coverage demand
In this section we develop a small microeconomic model for analyze the inter-
action between demand for health services and duplicate coverage. We based the
model in the following expression
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that means that the health stock at time t+1 depends on the stock at the past
period ht, some natural depreciation δt (caused i.e. by the age meaning older less
health), and some investment in health (for example sports, good food, preventive
and curative medical care), this three elements are carried to the next period using
a transformation function H function that we will recognize as the Health function
production[9], for now we will suppose that is increasing and strictly concave in all
the arguments.
Unfortunately (1) can be aﬀected at least for two uncertainty factors the ﬁrst one
the fatality (accidents, diseases, shocks in the individual’s health) and the second
the eﬀectiveness of treatments, incorporate this factors imply transform (1) in
(2) ht+1 = H((1 − δt)ht + ǫ,It )
Where ǫ and   are random variables with E[ǫ] = 0 and E[ ] = 1, ǫ represents
the uncertainty related to the determinants of health status and   represents the
eﬀectiveness of the medical care[5].
Now instead of considerer a many periods model we analyze the situation only
in one period of time1 subdivided in two moments
2 , at t = 0 the individual know
his/her current level of health (h0) but he doesn’t know the level of health through
the period and neither the ﬁnal level of health at the end of the period (h1).
We assume that the individuals have an compulsory health insurance that covers
a limited set of health problems and for covered diﬀerent issues they need to buy a
duplicate coverage (supplementary insurance coverage 3) and at the very beginning
he/she needs to decide about this insurance policy (to buy or not a duplicate cov-
erage). In some point (τ = 1) during the period the individual realizes his/her level
of health (pre-treatment level of health h) and decides how much health care he/she
wants[3], [8](see Figure 1) based in his/her budget constraint and preferences.
t = 0,τ = 0 τ = 1 t = 1,τ = 2
h0 h0,h h0,h,h1, 
Insurance Decision Medical Care Decision
Figure 1. Decisions schedule and information
The individual wants to maximize a von Neumann Morgenstern utility function
U(c,h1) where c is a composite consumption good and h1 is the ﬁnal health status.
We assume that U has the standard property that utility is strictly increasing
and strictly concave in both arguments goods U1.U2 > 0 and U11,U22 < 0. The
individual chooses the insurance policy (take dc = 1 or not a duplicate coverage
dc = 1), the level of health care v (measured as visits to the physician ) and the
level of c in order to maximize U(c,h1) .
We assume the existence of a co-payment k > 0 and a price pv > 0 for each visit
and if the individual decides to take a duplicate coverage pays a premium P, then,
1The period begins at t = 0 and ﬁnishes at t = 1
2The ﬁrst moment begins at τ = 0 and ends at τ = 1 and the second moment begins at τ = 1
and ends at τ = 2
3Supplemental health insurance is a type of insurance policy designed to cover the gaps that
the regular/compulsory health insurance may have.6 M. H. VARGAS AND M. ELHEWAIHI
if we suppose that the income of the individual is Y , he faces the following budget
constrain
(3) Y − dcP = c + v [(1 − dc)pv + k]
Because the individual takes decision in a sequential form we solve the prob-
lem backwards, that means that at ﬁrst we assume as given level of pretreatment
health(¯ h) and the insurance policy ( ¯ dc) and we ﬁnd a expression for the demand
of health care measured as number of visits V 4 and we use this expression for ﬁnd
the demand for health insurance DC. At time τ = 1, given a insurance policy ( ¯ dc)





Y − ¯ dcP − v
￿
(1 − ¯ dc)pv + k
￿
, ˜ H((1 − δ(A))¯ h,v)
o
Notice that in (4) instead of h1 we used ˜ H((1 − δ(A))¯ h,v)5 where A is a vector
of characteristics of the individual (like age, gender and others that determine the
deterioration of the health of the individual), because the individual evaluates his
own health at τ = 1 we assume that there is not unexpected shocks, that means
epsilon = 0 and we also assume without loss of generality that exists H such that
h1 = H((1 − δ(A))¯ h,v).
using the solution V (Y,h,dc,A) at the moment τ = 0, we ﬁnd the following
expected utilities corresponding to the choices dc = 1 and dc = 0
˙ U =
Z
U {Y − P − kV,H((1 − δ(A))h0 + ǫ,V )}Fǫ(ǫ|Z)dǫ (5)
¨ U =
Z
U {Y − (pv + k)V,H((1 − δ(A))h0 + ǫ,V )}Fǫ(ǫ|Z)dǫ (6)
where we assume that
(7) h1 = H((1 − δ(A))h0 + ǫ,V )
We also assume that ǫ is a random variable with cumulated distribution F(ǫ|Z)
where Z is a vector of variables that determines the likelihood of occurrence of
health shocks[18].
Because dc take only two values the choice is make it in base to a simple com-
parison between the expected utilities in the two cases, then DC(Y,h0,A,Z) = 1
if ˙ U ≥ ¨ U and 0 if it not the case.
4. Econometric methods
In this section we analyze maximum log likelihood (ML) methods for to study
the impact of the insurance policy DC (duplicate coverage)on the demand of health
care Vi (measured as number of visits to the doctor), as we saw in the past section
V depends on the duplicate coverage DC, the level of health at the point τ = 1
h, the income Y and a vector of characteristics of the individual A. Because
V = 1,2,3,··· we can use methods of count variables, then at ﬁrst time we describe
4We use V for denotate the demand of health care measured as number of visits
5 ˜ H acts in this case as a transformation of the health level at τ = 1 to the time τ = 2DUPLICATE COVERAGE AND HEALTH CARE DEMAND 7
the basic ideas behind the method for a single equation and afterward we extend
this method for deal with the endogeneity of DC.
Now we will assume that we have a sample of size N, every element repre-
sents an individual and we assign an index i = 1,...,N for to represent him/her
generically, now let Vi the dependent count variable (in our case the number of
visits), a diﬀerence of linear model in count models we are interested in the prob-
ability that the count (Vi) assumes a given value n = 1,2,3,··· this probability is
f(Vi = n|Ψ,x1i,DCi) (density function), x1i it is a vector of explanatory variables
and DCi it is the duplicate coverage index variable.





diﬀerent kind of densities give diﬀerent kind of models. The Poisson model is based
on the assumption that Vi has a Poisson distribution





where λi = exp(θDCi + x′
1iβ), and ΨP = (δ,β) is the set of parameters.
A more general model that the Poisson model is the Negative Binomial model












where λi = exp(θDCi+x′
1iβ) and ΨP = (α,δ,β) is the set of parameters parameters
of this model.
Notice that in both models the conditional mean speciﬁed is
(10) E(Vi|Ψ,x1i,DCi) = exp(θdci + x′
1iβ)
Under suitable assumptions this models can be estimated using the ML method,
but as consequence of the results and the theoretical analysis of the previous section,
in this case there is the possibility of endogeneity between the number of visits (Vi)
and the duplicate coverage index variable (DCi), if this is the case ML estimators
are no more reliable and we need to use methods of simultaneous equations. At date
there are a good quantity of methods for to deal with the problem of endogeneity,
a good survey of this methods can be found in Schellhorn [15], Romeu et al. [14]
and Terza et al. [17].
An natural solution for our case is the extension of the basic count model to
a count model with endogenous switching (ES)[16] that implies to analyze the
probability density function f(Vi|Γv,x1i,DCi,ζ1i) where Γv is a set of parameters




2iγ + ζ2i > 0
0 otherwise
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1 − ρ2
!
and fζ1i(ζ1i|Γ,DCi,x1i,x2i) is normal with mean zero and variance σ2, now if
























Where Γ = Γv ∪ γ,σ,ρ is the set of parameters and like in the basic count
model diﬀerent speciﬁcations of f(Vi|Γv,x1i,DCi,ξiσ
√
2) derivate in diﬀerent kind
of models i.e. we can specify a Poisson distribution or a Negative Binomial dis-
tribution, Γ can be estimated using the Full Information Maximum Log likelihood



















where as before λi = exp(θDCi+x′
1iβ), and ΓvP = (δ,β,σ) is the set of parameters.























where as always λi = exp(θDCi + x′
1iβ), and ΓvNB = (α,δ,β,σ) is the set of
parameters.
5. The Study Data
The data for this study have been driven from the Socio-economic Panel (SOEP).
The (SOEP) is a longitudinal as well as cross-sectional national survey representing
the persons and the households living in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
and done by the German Institute for Economic Research. The (SOEP) contains
among other things data on the health care consumption and the socio-economicDUPLICATE COVERAGE AND HEALTH CARE DEMAND 9
status of people in the (FRG) [10]. As we saw in the previous theoretical analysis
we need information about six groups variables the Endogenous variables (Health
care demand and duplicate coverage), Individual characteristics (A), Income (Y ),
pre treatment health status (h), previous health status (h0), and variables related
with the likelihood of health shocks (Occupation, and others).
The sub-sample that we use for our study was the people with more than 16
years old in the compulsory system, that means 9,330 observations, the variables
used in our study are listed in Table 2.
For measure the level of health services we used the number of doctor visits in the
last 3 months (VISITS) but unfortunately with the information in the wave 2005 is
not possible to classiﬁed the type of this visits (Specialist, GP and so on), we also
create a variable (DC) that represents the duplicate coverage and this variable is
equal to 1 if the individual declares that he has a supplemental private insurance
having been at the public insurance system.
For measure the level of income we used the household monthly net income
(INC) measured in thousand of euro, we include a variable (REGION) for analyze
the impact of to be in a more richer region (West Germany) and the number of
member in the household expecting that households has less income per person if
there is more members in the household.
For measure the health status through the period we used the self-reported
health status (HEA) in 2005 (how individual would evaluate their health status on
an ordinal scale) and the existence of disability (DISAB) for the same year. In the
case of the previous status we used self-reported health status (HEA0) for 2004
and two additional variables that we expect that are more related with the kind
of health problems that are covered with the duplicate coverage, the ﬁrst one is
related to the physical condition of the individual (PHYS) and the second one is
related with the mental health (PRESSED)6.
In the individual characteristics we include 3 variables the gender of the indi-
vidual (GENDER), the age (AGE, AGE2=AGE2) and for the education level we
used the education level with respect to High School (EDUHS). Finally we use
four variables to analyze the impact of the risk, at ﬁrst we use only two occupa-
tional categories (Blue collars and White collars), we use too a variable to identify
the head of the household (PRI), another one for the level of education of the
head (EDUHSPRI) and one variable that represents the level of physical activity
(PHYS).
6Unfortunately PRESSED and PHYS are only available in the new module of health that
SOEP began at 2002 and has been revised and put into a two year replication period.10 M. H. VARGAS AND M. ELHEWAIHI
Table 2. Summary of variables
Dependent
DC 0 without and 1 if duplicated coverage.
VISITS number of visits in the last 3 months.
Income
INC Income categories, the dummy variables are:
0-1000 (1, omitted), 1000-1500 (2), 1500-2000 (3),
2000-3000 (4), 3000-4000 (5), 4000,... (6).
WG 1 for West Germany and 0 for East Germany.
NHH Number of members in the Household
Health
HEA Health Status (2005), the dummy variables are:
(hea1, omitted) Very good,(hea2) Good,
(hea3) Satisfactory, (hea4) Poor or bad.
DISAB 0 without and 1 if there is present disability.
Individual Characteristics
GENDER 1 for females and 0 for males.
AGE years divided by 100.
EDUHS Education With Respect to High School
, the dummy variables are:
(1, omitted) Less than H S,
(2) High School, (3) More than H S
Risk likelihood
PRI 1 for head of household and 0 i.a.c.
EDUHSPRI Education level of the head ,
the dummy variables are:
(1, omitted) Less than H S,
(2) High School, (3) More than H S
OCCUP Occupation, the dummy variables are:
Blue collars , White collars , Others( omitted).
SPORT Frequency of sport or exercise (Almost never or never 1
Several times a year 2,At least once a month 3,
At least once a week 4)
Previous Health Status
HEA0 Health Status (2004), the dummy variables are:
(hea1, omitted) Very good,(hea2) Good,
(hea3) Satisfactory, (hea4) Poor or bad.
PRESSED Pressed for time in the last 4 Weeks ( Always 1,
Often 2, Sometimes 3, Almost Never 4, Never 5)
PHYS Strong Physical Pain in the last 4 Weeks ( Always 1,
Often 2, Sometimes 3, Almost Never 4, Never 5)DUPLICATE COVERAGE AND HEALTH CARE DEMAND 11
6. Results
In this section we presents the empirical results of the study, our strategy was
estimate diﬀerent type of models and compare them, at ﬁrst we estimate a Poisson
and a Negative Binomial model for explain the number of visits to the doctor in
last three months (V) in both cases we use as explanatory variables the duplicate
coverage (DC), Income variables (INC2-6, WG, NHH), Health variables (HEA2-4,
DISAB, PRESSED, PHYS), Individual characteristic variables (GENDER, AGE,
AGE2, AGE SQR, EDUHS2, EDUHS3).
We also estimate a Probit model to explain the Duplicate Coverage index (DC)
dependent on Income variables (INC2-6, WG, NHH), Previous Health variables
(HEA02-04, PRESSED, PHYS), Individual characteristic variables (GENDER, AGE,
AGE2, AGE SQR, EDUHS2, EDUHS3) and variables related with the likelihood
of health shocks (PRI, EDUHSPRI2-3, BLUE CO, WHITE CO, SPORT). Finally
we estimate a Endogenous Switching model using a Poisson distribution taking in
account the same variables as were used in the count and Probit models.
The Table 3 presents the results of the estimation using the Poisson,Negative
Binomial model (NB) and the ES and additionally we present an auxiliary probit
regression used to compare the impact on DC in diﬀerent scenarios the ﬁrst one
(probit) without considering the correlation between the duplicate coverage (DC)
and the number of visit to the doctor (VISITS) and the second scenario under the
ES model.
A general view of the results shows that unless some speciﬁc cases the results
are quite similar in terms of signiﬁcance and in the major of the cases in the sign
and value of the parameters. In ﬁrst time we observe a positive impact of the
duplicate coverage (DC) over the demand of health services measured as the
number of visit to the doctor (VISITS), in the three models we observe signiﬁcance
but under ES the eﬀect is greater, the second important aspect is the signiﬁcance
of ρ = −.615 meaning that there is feedback between the duplicate coverage and
the health services demand, in consequence DC is endogenous.
Analyzing the impact of the personal characteristics GENDER has a expected
positive impact over VISITS and over DC also, in the case of AGE we saw a U
impact over VISITS and no impact over DC, the level of education of the individual
has no eﬀect on VISITS a diﬀerence of the duplicate coverage where we see a positive
impact this can be explained by the fact that individual more educated enjoy more
the quality of the services and in Germany duplicate coverage gives a privileged
service (no waiting lists and private beds in hospitals are a good example).
The Income variables shows an expected behavior in the case of INC shows a not
so notorious U impact on VISITS fact can related with the fact that more richer
people have access a best services and have a better disposition to improve their
health easier, for other side INC has an expected impact on DC meaning more
income more insurance, in the case of the variables WG and NHH the ES model
since our point of view gives a more intuitive result meaning that WG has eﬀect
over DC but not over VISITS and NHH over VISITS and over DC.
For to analyze the impact of the current health we use the variable (HEA)
and as we saw the impact over VISITS is the expected meaning less health more
VISITS, we include too two variables more related with health PRESSED and
PHY assuming that this variables are more related to the kind of services that12 M. H. VARGAS AND M. ELHEWAIHI
Table 3. Health care estimations (n= 10,327)
MODEL NB2 POIS ES ES PROBIT
VISITS VISITS VISITS DC DC
DC 0.112* 0.116* 0.739*
GENDER 0.078* 0.072* 0.077* 0.086* 0.094*
AGE -1.008* -0.801* -0.946* 0.088 0.204
AGE SQR 0.954* 0.749* 1.008* -0.408 -0.497
EDUHS2 -0.015 -0.015 -0.037 0.342* 0.347*
EDUHS3 0.002 -0.002 -0.025 0.377* 0.370*
INC2 0.087* 0.103* 0.068* 0.238* 0.242*
INC3 0.093* 0.101* 0.077* 0.357* 0.403*
INC4 0.071 0.076 0.038 0.609* 0.632*
INC5 0.037 0.048 -0.015 0.760* 0.782*
INC6 -0.012 -0.009 -0.136* 1.058* 1.081*
WG 0.083* 0.093* 0.026 0.357 0.410*
NHH 0.001 0.000 0.024* -0.128* -0.130*
HEA2 0.122* 0.117* 0.127*
HEA3 0.383* 0.381* 0.375*
HEA4 0.913* 0.911* 0.881*
DISAB 0.247* 0.243* 0.268*
PRESSED -0.015 -0.018 -0.007 -0.063* -0.060*







BLUE CO -0.168* -0.121*
WHITE CO -0.069 -0.040
SPORT 0.121* 0.110*




∗ signiﬁcant at 5%
the duplicate coverage can be support 7, we can see that only PRESSED not has
impact over the number of visits.
We can see that the previous general level of health (HEA0, PHYS) doesn’t have
any impact on the duplicate coverage, the reason in quite simple, if we suppose
that our health status it is really bad we expect go a lot to the doctor and buy
a insurance will be a good choice in this case the fact is that in general many of
the health problems are covered for the compulsory system then is expected that
7Unfortunately this variables are only available for 2002,2004,and 2006 then we use the values
of the wave 2004 for PRESSED and PHYSDUPLICATE COVERAGE AND HEALTH CARE DEMAND 13
HEA0 doesn’t have any impact on DC, but this is not the case with PRESSED
that is more related with the type of diseases that DC covers.
Finally we will discuss the impact of the likelihood of health shocks on DC, like
in the case of the variables related to the initial health status it is important take
in mind that DC not covers every kind of disease instead is better think that covers
only small problems that are not covered by the compulsory system. PRI has a
positive impact because the head in the major of the cases gives more resources to
the familiar budget then the potential risk in augmented by this fact, in other side
the negative impact of BLUE CO is explained by the fact that duplicate coverage
in Germany cover correctives like glasses and Blue collars are less aﬀected for this
health problems, ﬁnally the positive sign of SPORTS meaning more exercise more
probability to get DC is explained by the fact that people that are doing exercise
often is more risky to suﬀer complex problems of health, problems that can be need
a specialist to solve them, and the other option is only because some DC policies
covers part of price of access to the gym.
7. Discussion
Using a negative binomial model, the determinants of the demand for medical
services as measured by the number of visits to physicians (general practitioners
and specialists) in one quarter are estimated, the results show that the duplicate
coverage have a positive impact in the demand for healths services, the acquisi-
tion of a duplicate coverage increase the number of visits. Our empirical results
emphasize the importance of health status and the duplicate coverage insurance as
determinants of health-care demand, and the higher importance of income variables
for to get a duplicate coverage.
On the basis of the a count data model estimated using the FIML methodology
we found enough evidence for reject the hypothesis of exogeneity in the choice of
duplicate coverage respect to the use of health services.
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